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THE NEW UNIFORM IMITED PARTNERSIP ACT:
A CRITIQUE
ROBERT A. KESSLER*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE limited partnership was one of America's early European
imports.1 In this business form, at least one person must have
unlimited liability for the business obligations of the entity, but all
other partners can, as in the modern corporation, have their liability
limited to their agreed contribution. 2 New York is credited with
having enacted the first American statute authorizing the limited
partnership. 3 Other states soon followed New York, and, in 1916, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, whose
function is to "promote uniformity in [state laws] on subjects where
uniformity is desirable and practicable," '4 proposed the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), which was subsequently enacted in every
state except Louisiana.5
6
In 1976, less than four years after the latest adoption of the ULPA,
the Commissioners promulgated a Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Developments during 1979 have lent added urgency to the
need to consider the effect which adoption of the new Act will have on
the state of limited partnership law. At present, three states have
already adopted the new ULPA.7 Furthermore, the Internal Revenue

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. This article is adapted from a study
prepared by Professor Kessler for the New York State Law Revision Commission.
1. H. Reuschlein & W. Gregory, Handbook on the Law of Agency and Partnership § 264, at
434 n.54 (1979); 2 S. Rowley, Partnership § 53.0, at 550 (2d ed. R. Rowley & D. Sive 1960).
2. See generally J. Crane & A. Bromberg, Law of Partnership § 26 (1968); H. Henn,
Handbook of the Law of Corporations §§ 28-36 (2d ed. 1970); H. Reuschlein & W. Gregory,
supra note 1, § 264; Symposium: Limited Partnership Act, 9 St. Mary's L.J. 441 (1978).
3. Act of Apr. 17, 1822, ch. 244, 1822 N.Y. Laws 259.
4. Constitution of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, art. I,
§ 1.2, reprinted in Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 270 (1978).
5. See 6 Uniform Laws Annotated 93 (Supp. 1979), Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916)
[hereinafter cited as ULPA (1916)], Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted.
6. Delaware was the last state to adopt the ULPA (1916). Act of June 25, 1973, ch. 105, 59
Del. Laws 192 (codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1701-33 (1974)).
7. Act of Mar. 29, 1979, no. 657, 1979 Ark. Acts (codified at Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-501
to -566 (Supp. 1979)); Act of June 14, 1979, Pub. Act No. 79-440, 1979 Conn. Legis. Serv. 1148
(West) (to be codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-9 to -37 (West)); Act of Mar. 6, 1979, ch.
153, §§ 17-14-201 to -1104, 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws 357. The Arkansas law provides in §§ 65-564,
-566 that the new Act governs limited partnerships formed after the effective date of the new Act,
while the old Act will continue to apply to limited partnerships formed previously, unless the
older partnerships elect to file a certificate under the new Act. Section 60 of the Connecticut
enactment provides that limited partnerships formed prior to the effective date of the new Act
continue to be governed by the old Act, except that such partnerships cannot be renewed unless
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Service has tentatively stated that limited partnerships formed under
the new Act should receive tax treatment virtually identical to that
8
afforded partnerships formed under the old Act.
This article briefly considers the differences between the old and the
new Uniform Limited Partnership Acts, and offers a critique of the
latter. Although the new Act is structured in a logical order which
serves as a framework for this discussion, the interrelationship of
certain articles of the new Act has dictated a topical, rather than a
section-by-section, analysis.
I.

CORPORATE LAW INFLUENCE

The limited partnership has always been a business alternative to
the corporation. Because a majority of states now allow a corporation
to be a general partner, 9 the combined limited liability of the limited
partners and the corporate general partner has rendered the limited
partnership the functional equivalent of a corporation.' 0 An assimilation of certain features of the corporation law into the limited partnership statutes is desirable, therefore, for simplicity as well as for
consistency of treatment.
renewal is provided for in the original agreement. The Wyoming statute is silent as to which law
will apply.
8. For a discussion of the characteristics which the IRS will consider in determining whether
a limited partnership should be classified as an "association," and therefore taxed as a corporation,
see Haims & Strock, Federal Income Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships Formed Under
the Revised Uniform Limited PartnershipAct, 9 St. Mary's L.J. 489, 505 (1978). When the new
Act was initially promulgated, there was concern as to whether the "safe harbor" provisions, see
notes 38-42 infra and accompanying text, risked such "centralization of management" as to lead
to the taxation of limited partnerships formed under the new Act as corporations, Section
303(b)(5)(v) of the new Act, specifying that a limited partner's exercise of his right to vote on the
removal of a general partner would not be construed as an act of control, was particularly
suspect. Recently, Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-12 I.R.B. 21, has indicated that voting on such matter
should not be an additional factor in tax classification, and thus reaffirmed the IRS acquiescence
in the interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960) found in Larson v. Commissioner, 66
T.C. 159 (1976), acq., 1979-12 I.R.B. 6, under which it is virtually impossible for a limited
partnership formed under the old ULPA to be taxed as a corporation. Forthcoming regulations
will indicate that limited partnerships formed under the 1916 and the 1976 Uniform Limited
Partnership Acts should be treated identically for tax classification purposes. Telephone Interview
with National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Sept. 17, 1979).
9. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-291(e)(4) (West 1960); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-1(1)(m)
(West 1969); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(a)(15) (McKinney 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
1701.13(F)(4) (Page 1978); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1302(18) (Purdon 1967).
10. When a corporation is the sole general partner, the limited partners have a status analogous
to that of non-voting corporate shareholders. Although widely used as "tax shelters," at least until the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), see Note, Tax Classificationof
Limited Partnerships,90 Harv. L. Rev. 745, 760-62 (1977), and the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978), the potential of the limited partnership as an ordinary business
vehicle, with the same effective limited liability as a close corporation but with greater flexibility of
operation, has not been fully realized.
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Accordingly, one of the most striking features of the new Act is the
extent to which it has borrowed from corporate law concepts. The new
ULPA sets forth name requirements, I a name reservation provision,12
a requirement for a registered agent, 13 a recordkeeping requirement
like that of a corporate stock book, 14 and a central filing provision.' 5
In addition, the new Act contains an article on foreign limited partnerships and their registration,' 6 similar to statutes governing qualification of foreign corporations, and an article on derivative actions. 17
While such correspondence with the corporate law is generally
beneficial, the value of such symmetry depends on the degree of
similarity between the corporate and limited partnership provisions.
Unfortunately, there is no uniform corporation law which coincides
with the new Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The closest analogue
is the Model Business Corporation Act, which, although influential,
has not been adopted in the most significant of corporate
jurisdictions-Delaware, New York, and California. Even in the
numerous jurisdictions which follow the Model Act, it has usually
been extensively modified: a model act, unlike a uniform act, carries
an implied invitation to selective adoption and modification of its
provisions. 18
Because of the divergence between the corporation statutes of the
various states, it is impossible to fashion a limited partnership act with
provisions which correspond to the corporate law of each jurisdiction.
The inevitable result is the necessity for numerous changes in the
language and the substance of the new Act to produce the necessary
correlation in each state adopting the new ULPA. By adopting so
many corporate analogues in the new ULPA, the Commissioners seem
to presuppose the desirability of such symmetry. The impossibility of
achieving complete congruence without extensive amendment to either
the state's corporation law or to the Uniform Act, which would destroy
its "uniform" character, is a major objection to the new Act.
I.

FORMALITIES OF ORGANIZATION

Unlike a general partnership, the formation of a limited partnership
is dependent upon compliance with statutory formalities. 19 The new
ii.

Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 102 (1976) [hereinafter cited by section or artide

number only].
12. § 103.
13. § 104.
14. § 105.
15. § 206.
16. Art. 9.
17. Art. 10.

18. Furthermore, the ABA committee which drafted the Model Act has been so active in
proposing amendments to it that it has become virtually impossible for legislators to keep up with the
latest version.
19. H. Henn, supra note 2, § 29, at 67.
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Act carries over from the old Act the requirement that a limited
partnership certificate be filed.2 0 There is some ambiguity in the
statute, however, as to the purpose of the certificate. According to the
Comment to section 201 of the new Act:
[T]he certificate is intended to serve two functions: first, to place creditors on notice of
the facts concerning the capital of the partnership and the rules regarding additional
contributions to and withdrawals from the partnership; second, to clearly delineate the
time at which persons become general partners and limited partners. 2'

Yet the avowed first purpose of the certificate-notice to creditors of
capital and contributions-conflicts with section 208, which provides
that the certificate is notice that "the partnership is a limited partnership and the persons designated therein as limited partners are limited
partners, but it is not notice of any other fact."' 22 Arguably, the
fundamental purpose of the certificate is, as the section states, simply
to inform third parties of the risks they take in dealing with a limited
partnership. This purpose is adequately served, however, by the
provision of the new Act which requires the name of the business to
include the words "limited partnership. '2 3 There is no reason to
assume that persons dealing with a limited partnership, identified as
such, are less sophisticated than those dealing with a corporation.
Furthermore, if the certificate serves only as notice of the partnership's
limited liability, the requirement of section 202(b) that the certificate be
promptly amended upon any change in the amount or character of
contributions seems clearly superfluous.
Therefore, it seems that the certificate is designed, as the quoted
Comment states, to provide more information than mere notice of
limited liability. The names and business addresses of the general
partners, required by section 201, are valuable items of information for
creditors, since the general partners are ultimately liable for the
partnership obligations. 24 Although the new Act requires it, 25 there is,
20.

Compare § 201 with ULPA § 2 (1916).

21. § 201, Comment. It is unclear how § 201(b), which provides that the limited partnership
begins when the certificate is filed, or at a later time specified therein, accomplishes the aim of
delineating the time at which persons become partners. Presumably, the Comment is also alluding to
§ 202's requirement of amendment of the certificate within 30 days to reflect the admission or
withdrawal of a limited partner.
22. § 208 (emphasis added).
23.

§ 102.

24. Obviously, any change in the information regarding the partners, especially the withdrawal of
a general partner, should result in amendment of the certificate. The simplest way of insuring such
amendment is to put the burden on the withdrawing partner to amend the certificate on pain of
continued personal liability until such change is made. In contrast, § 202(c) places liability for failure
to amend on the remaining general partners, possibly because a failure to amend could be construed
as a misrepresentation on their part.
25. § 201(a)(4).
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however, no real need to set forth any such information about the
partners who have only limited liability, 2 6 any more than there is a
need to compel the disclosure of the names of a corporation's shareholders to the corporation's creditors. If any additional information on
financial matters is desirable, it could well be limited to the total
amount of the limited partners' contributions and their right to withdraw from the partnership. 2 7 Such disclosure would give creditors
information on the total minimum capitalization of the partnership as
a guide to the amount of credit which could be extended without
relying on the personal liability of the general partners.
On the other hand, a fully detailed certificate might aid the partnership by obviating the need for a separate partnership agreement; in
fact, the new Act could have expressly permitted the certificate to
include the full partnership agreement, just as the certificate of incorporation may include shareholder agreements under some corporate
statutes. 28 But even if that section of the new Act which allows
insertion in the partnership certificate of "any other matters the
partners determine to include therein" 29 were to be broadly interpreted
to permit inclusion of the entire partnership agreement, few attorneys
would do so, because of the prompt amendment requirements and
liability provisions of the new ULPA. The new Act permits a party
injured by a false statement in the certificate to recover damages, and,
therefore, provides an inducement to keep certificate provisions to a
minimum. Because a statement may be rendered false by reason of the
fact that "any arrangement or other fact described in the certificate has
changed, making the statement inaccurate in any respect," 30 certificate
provisions could become a fertile source of litigation. A wise alternative might be to require lawyers to draft an express written agreement 31 in order to reduce certificate provisions to a minimum. 32
26. In this regard, it would be advisable to prohibit the use of the name of a limited partner in the
firm name, rather than risk creditor misapprehension by allowing its use under the exemption set
forth in § 102(2).
27. Apparently in keeping with this approach, § 201 does not carry over the requirement of
ULPA § 2(1)(a)(ix), (xii) that the profit shares and priorities of the limited partners be stated in the
certificate.
28. E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, § 618 (1964); S.C. Code § 33-11-220 (1976).
§ 201(a)(13).
§ 207(2). This section omits reference to the thirty-day grace period, provided by § 202(b),
during which the partnership must amend the certificate to reflect any change in financial
matters. Presumably, the period must be read into § 207(2). It is unclear, however, when the
29.
30.

grace period begins to run.
31. Under § 101(9), a partnership agreement may be written or oral.
32. Additionally, the new Act expressly requires the filing of the limited partnership certificate
with the respective secretary of state. § 206. Formerly, the location of the filing office was left to
the state's discretion. New York law currently mandates filing with the local county clerk. N.Y.
Partnership Law § 91(b) (McKinney 1948). Many other states have the same requirement. See J.
Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 2, § 26, at 145-46. Because the new Act also forbids the limited

FORDHAM LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 48

Although the framers of the new Act purport to recognize the partnership agreement as the basic document in any partnership, 3 3 their treatment of the partnership certificate has worked an unfortunate compromise between the philosophy of full incorporation of all vital matters and
that of mere notice to protect creditors, thereby perpetuating the am-

biguity of the old Act. 34 Both a partnership agreement and a detailed

certificate are, in effect, necessary, but neither is sufficient. The certificate, however, especially because of the vagueness of the changes
mandated by the new Act, may prove to be a liability trap.
III.

CONTROL

The old ULPA provides that a limited partner will lose his limited

liability if he takes part "in the control of the business.

35

One of the most

troublesome questions under the old Act is determining what constitutes
'3 6
an improper exercise of "control.
The revised Act generally carries over the prohibition against a limited

partner's exercise of control, but makes two modifications. First, a limited partner who takes part in the control of the business is liable only to
those who have actual knowledge of his participation, unless the exercise

of control is "substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a
general partner.

'3 7

According to the Comment to section 303, the uncer-

tainties of the "control" test make it unfair to impose unlimited liability on
a limited partner unless the third party has actual knowledge of the
limited partner's control. Liability may still be imposed, however, if the
limited partner exercises the same control as a general partner, but

manages to prevent third parties from knowing of his control. While the
partnership name to conflict with that of any corporation on record, § 102(4), a centralized,
integrated filing system will be required. While such a system requires a person seeking
information about a limited partnership to check only a single source, rather than having to
determine which county clerk's office to consult, and prevents confusion or possible deception
resulting from the existence of an incorporated and an unincorporated business using the same
name, the cost of such a system, especially in a populous state like New York, would be
considerable, especially if present local filings are to be integrated in the unified list.
33. ULPA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, (1976).
34. See H. Henn, supra note 2, § 29, at 67 n,2 (noting the dual philosophies of drafting
limited partnership certificates under the old Act).
35. ULPA § 7 (1916).
36. J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 2, § 26, at 147; see W. Cary, Partnership Planning
41 (1970); S. Rowley, supra note 1, § 53.7; Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 1471 (1969).
37. Section 303(a) of the revised Act provides: "Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited
partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner
or, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the
control of the business. However, if the limited partner's participation in the control of the
business is not substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner, he Is
liable only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge
of his participation in control."
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actual knowledge provision is worthwhile, it seems inevitable that the
section will transfer litigation from the uncertain determination of "control" to the almost equally vague determination of conduct "substantially
the same as" that of a general partner.
Second, the new Act supplies "safe harbor" provisions enumerating
activities which would not of themselves subject the limited partner to
unlimited liability. 38 These provisions are based largely on the Delaware, 39 Nevada, 40 and Washington 4 1 modifications of the old Act. Section 303(b) provides:
A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business.., solely by doing one
or more of the following:
(1) being a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership or of a
general partner;
(2) consulting with and advising a general partner with respect to the business of the
limited partnership;
(3) acting as surety for the limited partnership;
(4) approving or disapproving an amendment to the partnership agreement; or
(5) voting on one or more of the following matters:
(i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership;
(ii) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership other than in the ordinary course of its
business;
(iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership other than in the
ordinary course of its business;
(iv) a change in the nature of the business; or
(v) the removal of a general partner.4 2

The list of "safe" activities, specifically stated to be nonexclusive, 4 3 is
an eminently desirable provision. Although the section as a whole clearly
represents an improvement over the existing uniform Act, it does not
appear to go far enough. For example, the effect of section 303(b)(2) on a
leading case, Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helnan,44 is not clear. In that
case, the limited partnership agreement provided that the general partner
could exercise various financial powers only when he acted jointly with
the limited partners' nominee, who was also designated as general sales
38.

§ 303(b).

39.
40.
41.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1707 (1974).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 88.080 (1973).

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 25.08.070 (Supp. 1978). New York also specifies certain acts
which will not constitute "control." N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 96, 99, 115-a (McKinney Supp.
1978).

42. § 303(b). It would also have been worthwhile for the section to have stated that the
commencement of a derivative action, provided for by article 10 of the new Act, would not
constitute an exercise of control. See pt. IX infra.
43. "The enumeration in subsection (b)does not mean that the possession or exercise of any
other powers by a limited partner constitutes participation by him in the business of the limited
partnership." § 303(c).
44. 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959).
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manager. 45 The agreement also required repurchase of the limited
partners' interests if the nominee were discharged.4 6 The court held that
there was not a sufficient exercise of control by the limited partners to
subject them to individual liability because, despite the repurchase provisions, the nominee could be discharged at any time. 47 The conduct in
Plasteel, however, might well be construed as greater control than the
standard of "consulting with and advising a general partner with respect
to the business of the limited partnership, '4 8 and might, therefore,
expose the limited partners to personal liability. The statute ought to
make clear whether the case is to be followed or overruled.
A similar uncertainty exists in relation to another leading case,
Holzman v. DeEscamilla.4 9 Contrary to the result in Plasteel, the
limited partners were held to have participated in the control of a
business in which " 'there was never any crop that was planted or
contemplated in planting that wasn't thoroughly discussed and agreed
upon' " by the two limited partners and the general partner.5 0 The
general partner was, according to the court, "overruled" as to two
crops; moreover, checks required the signatures of any two of the three
partners, effectively vesting control of the partnership funds in the
limited partners. 5 ' Again, it is not clear under the statute whether such
control would go beyond the scope of permitted activities, making the
limited partners liable to those with, and possibly even to those
without,5 2 knowledge of the exercise of such powers. At least a
reference to the case in the Comment would have helped to clear up
53
the matter.
There is also a policy question to consider. If there is no deception
whereby an innocent third party is led mistakenly to believe that a
limited partner is a general one, on whose personal liability the third
party may depend, is it necessary to subject the limited partner to
personal liability at all, irrespective of the amount of control he is

45. Id. at 355.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 356.

48.

§ 303(b)(2).

49. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
50. Id. at 859, 195 P.2d at 834 (quoting record).
51.
Id. at 860, 195 P.2d at 834.

52. § 303(a).
53. Another minor problem area that should probably have been dealt with explicitly by the
new Act is whether personal liability would be imposed upon limited partners who exercise
"control" of the limited partnership as officers, directors, or shareholders of a corporate general
partner. See Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enterprises, 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 918 (Ct. App. 1977) (limited partners held not to incur personal liability by acting as
officers, directors, or shareholders of corporate general partner); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union
Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (1977) (same). But see Delaney v. Fidelity Lease
Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975) (contra).
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permitted to exercise by the general partners? Except to follow history,
there seems to be no good reason why a limited partner should not be
allowed to participate in management to the extent the general
partners are willing to allow him to do so, provided they are willing to
subject themselves to liability for his acts. A partnership, or even an
individual, can appoint an agent to do any legal act, provided the
appointing party is willing to assume the consequences. When an agent
acts within the scope of the powers given him, he is not personally
liable in contract to the outside party. It would seem logical to afford
similar treatment to a limited partner, provided, just as in an ordinary
agency, the third party is not misled. 54 When limited partners participate in control, the certificate filing provision required by the new Act
would adequately inform a third party of the distinction between the
liability of the general and limited partners. The internal relationship
among limited and general partners should be the concern only of the
latter. Accordingly, all personal liability of a limited partner should be
eliminated unless he meets the tests for liability of a general partner or
a partner by estoppel under the Uniform Partnership Act. 55
If tradition is to be maintained, however, the Delaware statute,
which is the most liberal of the deviations from the current Act, is
preferable to section 303. Most notably, the Delaware law provides
that a limited partner's approval or disapproval of "such material
matters related to the business of the partnership as shall be stated in
the certificate and in the partnership agreement" shall not be deemed
"control" for the purpose of establishing a limited partner's liability. 5 6
The Delaware provision, omitted in the new ULPA, would seem to
protect the limited partners in both the Plasteel and Holznzan decisions, provided the partnership purpose was clearly delineated in the
partnership certificate and agreement.

IV.

FINANCIAL MATTERS

A.

Contributions

The new Act, reversing the old Act, 5 7 expressly allows not only cash
and property, but also services rendered, and an obligation to perform
54. Section 303(d) is designed to prevent the flagrant misleading of creditors. "A limited
partner who knowingly permits his name to be used in the name of the limited partnership,
except under circumstances permitted by Section 102(2)(i), is liable to creditors who extend credit
to the limited partnership without actual knowledge that the limited partner is not a general
partner." § 303(d).
55.

Uniform Partnership Act § 16.

56. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1707 (1974). It would also have been beneficial if the new Act had
added to § 303(b)(5) the provision, contained in the Delaware statute, that voting on the election
of general partners, as well as on their removal, is not an exercise of control.
57. ULPA § 4 (1916).
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services, to constitute a partner's contribution.5 8 The new Act also
explicitly validates a contribution by way of "a promissory note or

other obligation to contribute cash or property,"5 9 which is permitted
60
only by implication under the old Act.

The wisdom of these provisions is debatable. Allowing the future

delivery of cash 61 or property to constitute a present contribution does

not seem dangerous to creditors 62 because a limited partnership, unlike
a corporation, offers creditors the added security of the general
partners' personal liability. 63 Permitting contributions in the form of
services to be rendered, however, seems certain to create problems.
Section 502(a) of the new ULPA stipulates the procedure for enforcement of a partner's contribution:

Except as provided in the certificate of limited partnership, a partner is obligated to
the limited partnership to perform any promise to contribute cash or property or to
perform services, even if he is unable to perform because of death, disability or any
other reason. If a partner does not make the required contribution of property or
services, he is obligated at the option of the limited partnership to contribute cash
equal to that portion of the value (as stated in the certificate of limited partnership) of
64
the stated contribution that has not been made.

Subsection (b) goes on to provide that a partner's obligation to make a
contribution may be compromised only by the consent of all partners,

unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise. A creditor who
has relied on the original obligation, however, may enforce it notwithstanding the compromise. The partnership cannot force the limited
partner to perform the promised services; it can only compel him to

contribute in cash the difference between the value of any partial
performance and the agreed value of the services as stated in the

certificate. If a partner has performed only in part, and that partial
performance is overvalued, allowing a relatively small cash contribu58. § 501. The drafters of the new Act may have been influenced by the argument that future
services should be allowed as consideration for the issuance of shares in a corporation. Sec
Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a Close
Corporation, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1098 (1962).
59. § 501.
60. See ULPA § 17(1)(b) (1916) (a limited partner is liable for "any unpaid contribution which
he agreed in the certificate to make in the future").
61. Future payment of cash is frequently prohibited as consideration for the issuance of
corporate shares. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 504(b) (McKinney 1963); ABA-ALI Model
Bus. Corp. Act § 19 (1971).
62. But see Gregory, The FinancialProvisions of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act: Articles 5 and 6, 9 St. Mary's L.J. 479, 481 (1978), which states that "section 501 could be
greatly improved from the standpoint of clarity in drafting, for it leaves open the possibility that
an obligation to contribute property twenty years in the future is a permissible form of
contribution by a limited partner."
63. Of course, a corporation may be a general partner in most states. See note 9 supra and
accompanying text.
64. § 502(a).
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tion to make up the remainder of the agreed value could permit the
actual value of the contribution to be less than stated without liability.
Prejudice to creditors, 65 as well as to present and future partners,
66
would result.
B.

Profits, Losses, and Distributions

Sections 503 and 504 of the new Act provide "default law" rules-rules to take effect in the absence of contrary agreement-to govern
the sharing of profits and losses, and distributions, among both the
general and limited partners. The profits and losses are to be "allocated
on the basis of the value (as stated in the certificate of limited
partnership) of the contributions made by each partner to the extent
they have been received by the partnership and have not been re-

turned. '67 Distributions are to be made on the same basis. 68
The Comments to these sections state that the old Act did not
provide a default law basis for the sharing of profits and losses and
distributions. This statement is not completely accurate, in that the old
Act requires that the certificate "shall state ... [t]he share of the profits
or other compensation by way of income which each limited partner
shall receive by reason of his contribution," 69 and contains a similar
provision as to returns of contribution. 70 The new Act provides that
the limited partnership certificate shall set forth any right of a partner
to receive distributions of property, including cash, 7 1 and any right of
a partner to receive a distribution which includes a return of any part
of his contribution. 7 2 The right of a partner to receive a distribution
upon the termination of his membership in the limited partnership,
however, need be included only if agreed upon. 73 Apparently, the new
Act does not make a certificate provision on the subject of distributions
mandatory unless the distributions include a return of contribution
65. For example, the same problems noted by Professor Herwitz in connection with watered
stock and corporate dissolution, see Herwitz, supra note 58, at 1105-06, would seem equally
applicable to a partnership if future services are to be permitted as contributions.
66. Section 502 contains further drafting deficiencies. It is unclear, for example, whether the
obligation to contribute in the future could be enforced by a new limited or general partner, or an
assignee, if the partnership itself did not elect to compel a contribution in cash.
67. § 503. This section states in full: "The profits and losses of a limited partnership shall
be
allocated among the partners, and among classes of partners, in the manner provided in the
partnership agreement. If the partnership agreement does not so provide, profits and losses
shall be allocated on the basis of the value (as stated in the certificate of limited partnership) of
the contributions made by each partner to the extent they have been received by the partnership
and have not been returned." Section 504 of the new Act is identical with respect to distributions.
68. § 504.
69. ULPA § 2(1)(a)(ix) (1916).
70. Id. § 2(1)(a)(xiv).
71. § 201(a)(9).
72. §§ 201(a)(10), 601(2).
73. § 201(a)(8).
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prior to withdrawal. 74 This lack of a clear distinction between permissive and mandatory provisions is a drafting deficiency of the new Act.
The Comments to the new Act are correct, however, in the sense
that the old Act does not make express provisions for distribution rights
as to general partners.7 S It does, however, grant the general partners
the same rights as partners in an ordinary partnership, 7 6 thereby
77
incorporating the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA).
Unfortunately, the new ULPA provides "default" rules as to distribution which are at variance with those in the UPA. 78 Moreover, from a

drafting standpoint, the references in the new ULPA to "contributions
made by each partner to the extent they have been received '7 9 seems
destined to cause interpretive problems in view of the allowance of
future services as contributions.
In addition, article 6 of the new Act states that both limited and
general partners may obtain "interim distributions"--distributions
made prior to a partner's withdrawal-at the time and to the extent
specified in the partnership agreement. 80 If, however, the distribution
includes a return of the partner's contribution, the limited partnership
certificate must specify when and how the distribution may be made. 8 1
The relationship between this section and the "default law" rules is
not clear. Although section 601 seems to require an agreement, even if
there is no agreement as to distribution a partner would presumably
be entitled to a distribution determined, in the absence of agreement,
by section 504. Clarification and cross-reference between sections 601
and 504 appears necessary, especially since section 606 grants creditor
status to a partner who is entitled to a distribution, 82 conferring on
partners a status equal to the outside creditors.
74. Although § 201(a)(9) could be construed as a blanket provision, requiring that all rights to
receive distributions from the limited partnership be stated in the certificate, such a reading seems
to conflict with § 604. Section 604 states: "Except as provided in this Article, upon withdrawal
any withdrawing partner is entitled to receive any distribution to which he is entitled under the
partnership agreement and, if not otherwise provided in the agreement, he is entitled to receive,
within a reasonable time after withdrawal, the fair value of his interest in the limited partnership
as of the date of withdrawal based upon his right to share in distributions from the limited
partnership." (emphasis added). The reference to the partnership agreement in § 604 would imply
that the certificate provisions as to distributions are permissive, not mandatory.
75. See ULPA § 9 (1916).
76. Id.
77. Uniform Partnership Act § 18(a).
78. The Uniform Partnership Act § 18(a) provides that all partners should be repaid their
contributions, and then share equally in the remaining prolits or surplus. The new ULPA states
that distributions should be made on the basis of the contributions received by the partnership
and not yet returned. § 504.
79. §§ 503, 504 (emphasis added).

80.
81.
82.

§ 601(1).
§ 601(2).
See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text.
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Section 605 carries over in part the provisions of the prior law by
providing that a partner has no right to receive any distribution except
in cash, regardless of the nature of his contribution. 8 3 Unlike the old
law, however, the new Act apparently requires a certificate provision
to authorize a non-cash distribution. 84 According to the Comment to
section 605, the section is designed to "protect a limited partner (and
the remaining partners) against a distribution in kind of more than his
share of particular assets. 8 5 It is unclear why such protection is
necessary, but, presumably, it is designed to avoid an unfair shifting of
tax benefits and liabilities. Nevertheless, it is unclear how much
protection will actually be afforded other partners by a provision that
the withdrawing partner cannot be compelled to accept more than his
share.
Section 606 confers creditor status upon a partner once he "becomes
entitled to receive a distribution.1 86 This provision dangerously dilutes
outside creditor protection because it applies even to general partners.
Fortunately, section 607 provides that a partner may not receive a
distribution if it would render the partnership insolvent. Further,
section 608 obligates all partners to repay rightful and wrongful
returns of their contributions when necessary to meet liabilities to
creditors, but, unlike the old Act,8 7 imposes a time limit on the
obligation.8 8 While requiring a partner to repay such returns is a wise
creditor safeguard, it does seem inconsistent with section 606, which
characterizes partners as "creditors" as to distributions.
C.

Withdrawal

Upon withdrawal, a partner, unless otherwise provided in the
partnership agreement, is entitled to "the fair value of his interest in
the limited partnership as of the date of withdrawal based upon his
right to share in distributions from the limited partnership."8 9 Read
together with the applicable default law rules, this would mean that,
83.

Compare § 605 with ULPA § 16(3) (1916).

84. ULPA § 16(3) (1916) states that the consent of all the partners is sufficient to permit
non-cash distributions.
85. § 605, Comment.
86. "At the time a partner becomes entitled to receive a distribution, he has the status of, and
is entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the limited partnership with respect to the
distribution." § 606.
87. ULPA § 17(2)(b) (1916).
88. The section imposes a six-year period of limitation, during which the partner is liable to
return any distribution containing a part of his contribution. § 608.
89. § 604. Apparently, "interest in the limited partnership" as it is used in § 604 does not
mean the same as "partnership interest," which is defined in § 101(10) to mean "a partner's share
of the profits and losses of a limited partnership and the right to receive distributions of
partnership assets." If the two terms were equated, the circularity of the definitions would be
obvious. "Interest in the limited partnership" seems to mean something closer to "book value."
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absent a provision in the agreement, a withdrawing partner would be
entitled to a distribution upon withdrawal determined by multiplying
the percentage of his total contribution, as received by the partnership
and not yet returned, 90 by the value of the partnership assets at the
time of withdrawal. The complexity of the default law provisions gives
an added incentive to limited partnership organizers to draft a detailed
partnership agreement.
D. Priorities
Section 804 provides new priority rules to govern the winding up of
a limited partnership. The Comment to the section summarizes them:
Section 804 revises Section 23 of the prior uniform law by providing that (1) to the
extent partners are also creditors, other than in respect of their interests in the
partnership, they share with other creditors, (2) once the partnership's obligation to
make a distribution accrues, it must be paid before any other distributions of an
"equity" nature are made, and (3) general and limited partners rank on the same level
except as otherwise provided in the partnership agreement. 9 1

The wisdom of the policy decisions implicit in the Comment is
extremely dubious. If the goal of the new ULPA is to equalize the
treatment of limited partnerships with that of corporations, then, by
analogy, limited partners resemble preferred shareholders vis-a-vis the
"common" shareholders, the general partners. Accordingly, limited
partners should have a priority in winding up to the extent of their
limited interest. Even more questionable is the rule giving any partner,
general or limited, a status equal to outside creditors with respect to
loans to the business. Old ULPA section 13, providing that limited
partners share claims for money lent to the partnership pro rata with
general creditors, and section 23, giving non-partner creditors priority
over partner creditors as to partnership assets, seem to provide a fairer
order of repayment.
Furthermore, new section 804 raises the question, frequently litigated in the corporate context, of whether loans are genuine, or merely
disguised contributions to capital. If all insider "loans" are upheld,
merely because they are characterized as loans, the Act will give a
distinct advantage to the limited partnership over its corporate
analogue, but only until creditors realize the insecurity of their position.
90. Once again, the acceptance of future services as a contribution would appear to create
difficulties in calculating shares.
91. § 804, Comment. Under the old law, creditors were paid first, followed by payments to
limited partners both as to profits and returns of contribution, with general partners having least
priority. ULPA § 23 (1916). The apparent effect of § 804 is to "bracket" limited and general
partners together. Even though this order of repayment can be varied by the partnership
agreement, the section significantly downgrades the rights of limited partners.
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Apparently, recognition of all loans by a partner to the partnership
was not intended. The Comment to section 107, expressly authorizing
loans by both general and limited partners, addresses the problem: "Of
course, other doctrines developed under bankruptcy and insolvency
laws may require the subordination of loans by partners under appropriate circumstances. '9 2 The Comment, however, provides no real
solution, since what 9law
exists on the subject in the corporate field is
3
far from consistent.
The new Act also omits the prohibitions of old ULPA section 13
against repayment of loans made by limited partners when the
partnership does not have sufficient assets to discharge partnership
liabilities to non-partners, and against limited partners receiving or
holding partnership property as collateral security for their loans. The
second prohibition has been interpreted so as to allow a limited partner
to become a secured creditor when the partnership was not insolvent
when the security was given 9 4 -an interpretation which was hardly
mandated by the language of the provision. Nevertheless, under the
new Act these matters are to be left to be resolved by the enacting
state's fraudulent conveyance statute. The omission is probably justified because the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, section 8,
probably gives sufficient protection to creditors in both instances
covered by section 13.
The new Act apparently allows both general and limited partners to
make secured loans, provided they are made while the partnership
meets the solvency requirements of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act. 95
If the wisdom of allowing ordinary loans by general partners is
dubious, however, allowing secured loans is doubly so, since general
partners will then enjoy priority over all other partners. At best, this
will mean priority of the general partner's personal creditors over his
business creditors. Despite a superficial appearance of modernity,
therefore, it is by no means clear that the financial provisions of the
new Act represent an improvement in policy or clarity over the old
ULPA.

V.

TRANSFERS

One of the attractive features
small businesses is the principle
interests, including those in a
transferable. Although a share in

of the limited partnership form for
of delectus personarumi: partnership
limited partnership, are not freely
the profits is assignable, substitution

92.

§ 107, Comment.

93.

See Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958). H. Henn. supra note 2, § 152.

94.

Hughes v. Dash, 309 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally J Crane & A. Bromberg. supra

note 2, § 93, at 550.
95. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 8.
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of the transferee in the business requires consent 96of the remaining
partners unless the agreement provides otherwise.
As Professor O'Neal has indicated with respect to close corporations,

"shareholders . . .usually desire to retain the power to choose future

associates.1 97 The reasons for this desire are common to the partnership as well as to the small corporation; for example:
Each shareholder wants to be in a position to prevent outsiders from entering the
business if he doubts their integrity or business judgment, or feels that working with
them would be unpleasant or unrewarding. . . . A purchaser of shares may have
neither the ability nor the desire to do the work previously performed by his vendor, or
he may not be able to work congenially with the other participants. 9'

Although some recent corporate statutes have recognized the importance of transfer restrictions to close corporations, 9 9 there is still some
doubt as to the validity of transfer restrictions in many states, °O
especially as to those restrictions which require the consent of the
remaining participants. 10 Therefore, the absolute availability of such
restrictions in the partnership is still one of its principal advantages
over the corporation for small businessmen.
While a limited partner's interest is ordinarily assignable, 102 the new
Act carries over the old law's implied requirement that the admission
of a new general or limited partner to membership requires the consent
of all partners. In a clarification of the requirements of the prior law,
the new ULPA provides that, after the original filing, the admission of
new general partners requires the specific written consent of each
partner.103 If the interest is acquired directly from the partnership,
additional limited partners may be admitted pursuant to the partnership agreement or, if the agreement is silent, upon written consent of
all partners. 104 An assignee of a limited partnership interest may also
become a limited partner if his assignor, pursuant to a certificate
provision, has the right to confer such status upon him, or if all the
partners consent. 105 In the case of the additional partner, the individ96.

ULPA § 19 (1916).

97.

2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 7.02 (1971).

98. Id.
99. Id. § 7.06 a.
100. Id. §§ 7.06, .09, .10.
101. Id. § 7.08.

102. Section 702 follows ULPA § 19(1) (1916) in making a limited partner's interest generally
assignable.
103. § 401. The old Act required the consent of all limited partners to the addition of a new
general partner, ULPA § 9(1)(e) (1916), but did not expressly require consent of all general
partners as well. But see ULPA § 25(1)(b) (1916) (requiring all members of the partnership to sign
any amendment to the certificate adding a limited or general partner). Section 704(a) allows an
assignee of a general partner to become a limited partner only, The new Act might have achieved
greater clarity by completely separate treatment of general and limited partners, rather than using
"partner," except where qualified, to refer to both. § 101(8).
104.

§ 301.

105.

§ 704.
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ual will become a limited6 partner only upon amendment of the limited
0
partnership certificate. 1
Although there is nothing objectionable about allowing the partnership to restrict the assignment of limited partnership interests, 107 there
is uncertainty created by the Comment to the assignment section as to
the exact extent to which such restrictions are valid. The Comment
states that "there was no intention to affect in any way the usual
rules regarding restraints on alienation of personal property."' 0 8 Moreover, the restriction requiring "specific written consent" of each partner, limited and general, to the admission of any new general partner
is unwise, especially since the Comment states that such consent "must
specifically identify the general partner involved."' 1 9 This requirement
seems to preclude any advance authorization for the admission of new
general partners, and seems overly restrictive. The Uniform Partnership Act, in contrast, has no such requirement for written consent. 1 0
From a policy standpoint, it might have been simpler to reverse the
direction of the statute by making limited partnership interests freely
transferable subject to restriction by the agreement."' Because the
status of limited partners is, as has been suggested, analogous to that
of preferred shareholders, and their intrusion into the operation of the
business is even more circumscribed, free transferability of the limited
partners' interests, once their full agreed contribution has been made,
is probably more often desired than not. In any event, an express
authorization for fractionalization of interest, without the necessity for
certificate amendment, 1 2 would have been desirable, especially in
large investment partnerships.
The new Act's treatment of assignees who become limited partners is
analogous to the treatment of a bona fide transferee of watered stock.
Thus, an assignor limited partner remains liable for his contribution

106. § 301(b). The condition of certificate amendment might be inferred as to assignees as
well. See note 21 supra. The new Act also makes certain stylistic changes, eliminating the term
"substituted" limited partner found in ULPA § 19(2) (1916). § 704. It also states that a partneres
interest is assignable "in whole or in part." § 702.
107. See Chaiken v. Employment Security Comm'n, 274 A.2d 707, 709 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971).
108. § 702, Comment.
109. § 401, Comment.
110. See Uniform Partnership Act § 18(g).
111. Of course, the partnership certificate can always make free transferability the rule- §
704. Moreover, free transferability has its own dangers. Free transferability of interest is a factor
which points to corporate taxation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960). Free transferability,
however, was not fatal to the taxation of a limited partnership as a partnership in Larson v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). Retention of the old rule might have been dictated by a desire
on the part of the drafters to avoid possible taxation of a limited partnership formed under the
new Act as a corporation. See Haims & Strock, supra note 8, at 517-18. 521.
112. §§ 202(b), 702.
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and any false statements made in the certificate. 1t 3 The assignee is,
however, at least liable for his assignor's other obligations, except for
those which were unknown to the assignee and which he could not
discover from the certificate. 1 14 Once again, the effect which the new
Act's liberality regarding future services will have on the assignee's
ability to fulfill the assignor's obligations is unclear.
Additionally, section 705 of the revised Act states that the estate of a
partner may, for settlement and administration purposes, exercise all
the late partner's rights, including the right to confer limited partner
status on an assignee. But the estate's liabilities, as opposed to rights,
are not prescribed. The Comment states that in drafting the section,
"[f]ormer [ULPA] Section 21(2), making a deceased limited partner's
estate liable for his liabilities as a limited partner was deleted as
superfluous, with no intention of changing the liability of the estate. "' 1 5 Yet the liability of a partner's estate where the business is6
continued is one of the most troublesome areas of partnership law.'
A more explicit treatment, rather than avoidance of the problem,
would have been welcome.
A related matter is the right of the limited partners to information
about the business. Old ULPA section 10 gives the limited partners the
right to inspect and copy the partnership books, and to receive a
"formal account of partnership affairs, whenever circumstances render
it just and reasonable."' 17 The right to information under the new Act
is established by reading two sections together. Section 105 recites the
records to be kept by a limited partnership, but makes no specific
reference to the books of account. Section 305 mandates that limited
partners have access to the specified records and "other information
regarding the affairs of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable."' 8 Even preferred shareholders generally have greater inspection
rights." 9 Since limited partners are "locked in," unlike preferred
shareholders who can generally transfer their shares, it would seem
fairer to give them broader inspection rights than those afforded by the
vague "just and reasonable" standard.
113.

§ 704(c).

114. § 704(b). Non-release of the assignor does not preclude assignee liability for the same
obligation.
115.

§ 705, Comment.

116. W. Cary, supra note 36, at 55. Section 702 states that "[elxcept as provided in the
partnership agreement, a partner ceases to be a partner upon assignment of all his partnership
interest." The effect on a general partner's liabilities is not spelled out. Section 403 merely
cross-references to the liabilities of a general partner in an ordinary partnership.
117. ULPA § 10(b) (1916).
118. § 305(2)(iii).
119. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 624 (McKinney 1963); ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act §
52 (1971); 2 F. O'Neal, supra note 97, § 7.03. Despite the elaborate list of records to be kept, §
105, in which the limited partner has an inspection right, § 305, the actual books of account are
omitted. The word "any" before "financial statements" in § 105 obviously does not mandate their
preparation, and access to "full information regarding the state of the business and financial
condition" in § 305 is ambiguous as to any right to examine the actual records of account.
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VI.

WITHDRAWAL

Sections 402 and 602 provide the rules governing the withdrawal of a
general partner, while section 603 contains the corresponding provisions
for a limited partner. Other than the provision in section 602, which
entities the limited partnership to recover damages from ageneral partner
who withdraws in violation of the partnership agreement,1 2 0 but which is
unclear as to whether the damages may exceed the general partner's share
of distributions, 12 1 the principal importance of the withdrawal sections is
in relation to the dissolution of the partnership. The new Act conceptually
distinguishes between withdrawal, 122 on the one hand, and dissolution, 123 winding up,' 24 and continuationl 25 on the other. This categorization differs from that of the Uniform Partnership Act, which distinguishes between events causing dissolution, and winding up.' 12 6 In
the UPA, dissolution and termination, which follows upon winding up,
are not synonymous. 12 7 In contrast, the new Limited Partnership Act
generally equates dissolution and termination unless the conditions for
continuation of the entity are met.' 28 Therefore, the new Act's incorporation of the Uniform Partnership Act 2 9 may pose interpretive problems
because of the inexact congruence. A redrafting of both Acts concurrently
might have avoided this difficulty by enabling an exact cross-reference to
the UPA for all provisions pertaining to general partners. At any rate, the
terminology of the new Act is ambiguous. Ideally, an "event of
withdrawal" should give a right to "winding up," absent a provision
for "continuation." The additional references to dissolution and termination, as well, in the new Act, only confuse matters.
VII.

DISSOLUTION

The old Act contained rather scant provisions on dissolution 30 and
none on winding up except for the provision that a limited partner had the

120. No such liability attaches for the withdrawal of a limited partner.
121. § 602: See Uniform Partnership Act § 38(2)(11) (stating merely that the partners have a
right to damages for breach of the agreement).
122. §§ 402, 602, 603. See also § 101(3) (" 'Event of withdrawal of a general partner' means
an event that causes a person to cease to be a general partner as provided in Section 402.').
123. §§ 801, 802. Under § 801, dissolution is to be followed by winding up unless there is
continuation.under § 801(3). See also § 303(b)(5)(i) (allowing voting on the dissolution and
winding up of a limited partnership).
124. § 803.
125. § 801(3).
126. See Uniform Partnership Act § 30 ("On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.").
127. See Uniform Partnership Act §§ 29, 30; J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 2, § 73
128. § 801(3). Section 201(a)(8) allows the limited partnership certificate to fix the terms and
conditions of termination and distribution.
129. § 1105.
130. ULPA §§ 9(1)(g), 16, 20 (1916).
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right to dissolve the partnership and have its affairs wound up if the
partnership was unable or unwilling to make repayment of the limited
partner's contribution. 131 The revised Act substitutes an entire detailed
article on dissolution. 1 3 2 Generally, withdrawal and dissolution under
the new Act have the same results as under the old law. Thus, the death or
withdrawal of a limited partner does not affect the continued existence of
the partnership.1 33 The death, withdrawal, or insanity of a general
partner continues to result in the dissolution of the partnership 134 subject
to section 801, which allows for continuation of the partnership if another
34
general partner is available or if a replacement can be agreed upon. 1
When such continuation is not possible, winding up will follow dissolu5
tion.

13

The events that constitute withdrawal of a general partner, and there36

fore lead to dissolution, have been precisely defined by the new Act.'

Withdrawal may include the voluntary withdrawal of a general partner,
even if in violation of the partnership agreement; 1 37 the assignment of a
partner's entire interest; 138 or the removal of a partner pursuant to the
agreement. 1 3 9 Another event of withdrawal has been added to take
account of corporations that become general partners: corporate dissolution is now the equivalent of death as to a corporate partner. 1 40 The
131. ULPA § 16(4) (1916).
132. Art. 8.
133. Compare 33 603, 705 of the new Act with ULPA §§ 16, 21 (1916).
134. §§ 402, 801(3).
135. "A limited partnership is dissolved and its affairs ;hall be wound up upon the happening of
the first to occur of the following:
(1) at the time or upon the happening of events specified in the certificate of limited partnership;
(2) written consent of all partners;
(3) an event of withdrawal of a general partner unless at the time there is at least one other general
partner and the certificate of limited partnership permits the business of the limited partnership to be
carried on by the remaining general partner and that partner does so, but the limited partnership Is
not dissolved and is not required to be wound up by reason of any event of withdrawal if, within 90
days after the withdrawal, all partners agree in writing to continue the business of the limited
partnership and to the appointment of one or more additional general partners if necessary or desired;
or
(4) entry of a decree of judicial dissolution under Section 802." § 801.
136.
§ 402. The introductory paragraph of the section, however, contains an instance of poor
draftsmanship. It would appear that a partner who has withdrawn because of death or Insanity
would nevertheless be required to give his consent to the continuation of the partnership. The
language should be changed to clarify the matter: "Except as approved by the specific written consent
of all [remaining] partners at the time, a person ceases to be a general partner of a limited partnership
upon the happening of any of the following events: .....
§ 402.
137.
§§ 402(1), 602.
138. §§ 402(2), 702.
139. § 402(3).
140. § 402(9). The dissolution and winding up of a general partner which is a separate partnership has the same effect as a corporate partner's dissolution, as does the distribution of an estate
which holds a partnership interest. § 402(8), (10).
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bankruptcy of a general partner will also constitute withdrawal,1 4 1 as
will other bankruptcy related events. 14 2 In addition, insanity has been
defined to mean an adjudication of incompetence, correcting an anomaly

1 43
in the old Act.
The dissolution article is not without problems, however. Section

801(3) provides for a ninety-day period after an event of withdrawal
during which all partners may agree in writing to the continuation of the
business. 144 The effect of this section is to create an extended limbo period
during which it is uncertain whether the partnership will continue.
Moreover, the winding up provisions of section 803 fail to make reference
to this ninety-day time span, creating uncertainty as to the effect which it

will have on winding

up. 14 5

Neither is it clear whether the general

partners' agency powers to bind the partnership will continue through the

ninety days, despite the new Act's incorporation of the Uniform Partner46
ship Act's provisions on that subject.'
VIII.

FOREIGN LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

In an attempt to remedy a problem area under the old law, 147 article 9
of the new Act provides detailed rules on the right of a limited partnership
to do business in a state other than that of its formation. The provisions of
the new Act regarding these foreign limited partnerships parallel those of
statutes dealing with the qualification of foreign corporations to do business within another state.
Procedurally, the new Act requires that foreign limited partnerships
apply for a certificate of registration from any state in which they seek to
141. § 402(4). The old Act was silent on the subject of bankruptcy, although under the Uniform
Partnership Act § 31(5) the bankruptcy of a partner brought about dissolution.
142. § 402(4), (5). Subsection (5) appears to be defective in permitting the mere bringing of an
action for dissolution of a corporate partner, rather than a judgment of dissolution, to cause the
partnership to be dissolved. An action for corporate dissolution is so unlikely to succeed that itshould
not be made a sufficient condition for the dissolution of a limited partnership.
143. § 402(6)(ii). While the Uniform Partnership Act § 32(l)(a), (b) set out an "incompetence"
standard, similar to the new Act, ULPA § 20 (1916) uses the word "insanity" only, without
reference to any adjudication.
145. Winding up may be accomplished by general partners who have not wrongfully dissolved
the partnership or, if no such general partners exist, by the limited partners. A court may also wind up
a partnership upon the application of a partner, his legal representative, or his assignee. § 803. The
standard for judicial dissolution, however, is troublesome. Section 802 allows judicial dissolution
"whenever itis not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership
agreement." This test seems unnecessarily vague when contrasted to the detail provided by
Uniform Partnership Act § 32.
146. The old Act was silent at to the effect of dissolution on the agency powers of the general
partners. Although the new Act states in § 1105 that the Uniform Partnership Act %villgovern any
cases not provided for, the relevant provision, Uniform Partnership Act § 9,is not readily applicable
to such a ninety-day limbo period.
147. J. Crane & A. Bromberg, supra note 2, § 22A, at 108-09.
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do business. 148 The application for registration need only set forth basic
information concerning the partnership, including the general character
of the business, the agent for service of process, and the names and
addresses of partners.' 49 While the registration must be amended upon
any change in the information,1 50 presumably to protect creditors, it need
not set out the amount of the partners' contributions-a more crucial
creditor concern. 1 5 ' Failure to register as a foreign limited partnership
results in disqualification to sue in the foreign state, 5 2 and a state official
may seek to enjoin an unregistered
partnership from doing business in the
53
state of disqualification.1
The introductory section of the new article combines two substantive
rules governing foreign limited partnerships.
Section 901. [Law Governing.] Subject to the Constitution of this State, (1) the laws of the
state under which a foreign limited partnership is organized govern its organization and
internal affairs and the liability of its limited partners, and (2) a foreign limited partnership may not be denied
registration by reason of any difference between those laws and the
154
laws of this State.

This section appears to be influenced by the Model Business Corporation Act, '5 5 but differs in two material respects. First, under the new Act,
a state may bar the admission of a foreign limited partnership or regulate
its internal affairs only if authorized to do so by a state constitutional
provision. Second, the new Act, unlike the Model Act, fails to limit the
permissible activities of a foreign limited partnership to those businesses in which domestic limited partnerships may engage.
New York has receAtly proposed its own solution to the problem of
foreign limited partnerships through an amendment to the Partnership
Law.' 5 6 In brief, the new New York statute requires a foreign limited
partnership to have a certificate of authorization, issued by the department of state, before doing business or holding real property in the
148. § 902. The secretary of state will issue the certificate of registration upon payment of tile
necessary fees. § 903. The foreign limited partnership may even register under a name other than the
one used in the state of its formation, provided the name contains the words "limited partnership."
149. § 902.
150. § 905. There is no provision for voluntary amendment of the registration, as is provided for a
domestic partnership in § 202(d). Article 9 of the revised Act apparently does not require the
registration to be cancelled even if the certificate of limited partnership in the state of organization Is
cancelled.
151. Compare § 902 with § 201(a)(4), (5). If the information as to contributions is important
enough to warrant inclusion in the original certificate, its inclusion would seem equally important in
foreign partnership filings. Filing with the foreign state a copy of the limited partnership certificate
that is on file with the home state would seem to be a reasonable requirement-one which New York
has recently adopted. See note 159 infra and accompanying text.
152. § 907.
153. § 908.
154. § 901.
155. See ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 106 (1971).
156. Act of July 10, 1979, ch. 519, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1073 (McKinney) (effective Jan. 1, 1980) (to
be codified at N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 120 to 120-1 (HcKinney)).
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state.1 57 It also sets forth a non-exclusive list of activities which will not
constitute "doing business." 15 8 The foreign limited partnership must file a
copy of the certificate under which it is organized in its home state, and
must provide additional information about partners, contributions, assignment, and priorities if it is not contained therein.1 5 9 The partnership
must also designate the secretary of state as its agent for the service of
process, and must specify its principal place of business within New
60
York. 1
The issuance of a certificate of authority permits the foreign limited
partnership to do in New York any business "which may be done lawfully
in [New York] by a limited partnership organized under the laws of [New
York], to the extent that it is authorized to do such business in the state,
territory, or country where it was created, but not other business."' 16 1 The
"rights, powers and privileges" to be exercised by the partners of foreign
limited partnerships are limited to those enjoyed by partners of domestic
limited partnerships. 162 The failure to register does not render the contracts of the foreign partnership invalid, but the partnership may not
maintain any action or special proceeding within the state, although it
may defend suits brought against it. 1 63 As under the new ULPA, the state
attorney general may bring an action to restrain an unauthorized limited
16 4
partnership from doing any business within New York.
This new article of the New York Partnership Law seems preferable to
its counterpart in the revised ULPA. First, the New York provision
prohibiting a foreign limited partnership from doing any business prohibited to a domestic limited partnership is probably a wise one, because it
avoids any inequity in the treatment of local and foreign businesses.
Moreover, a conflict between the Partnership Law and the various New
York statutes prohibiting the conduct of certain businesses by limited
partnerships or nonresidents is also avoided. 65 Second, because the New
§ 120-a(1).
§ 120-a(2).

157.
158.

Id.
Id.

159.

Id. § 120-b(1), (2).

160.

Id.

161.

Id. § 120-b(3).

162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. § 120-f.
Id. § 120-h.

§ 120-b(2).

165. The New York Constitution does not contain any limitations upon the businesses which
may be conducted by partnerships; therefore, § 901 of the new ULPA would not empower the state to
place any restrictions on the internal affairs or admission of a foreign limited partnership. The new

New York amendment, on the other hand, allows that state to give effect to various statutory
restrictions on the partnership form. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2801-a4)tc) (McKinney
1977) (a hospital shall notbe operated bya limited partnership); N.Y. Banking Law § 180(McKinney
1971) (partnerships not qualifying as private bankers may not engage in banking); N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law §§ 455, 456 (McKinney 1968) (partnerships other than law firms may not engage in -budget
planning"); N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 441, 441-b (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978) (special licensing
requirements ofpartnerships of real estate brokers). As to admission requirements, there would seem

to be no constitutional problem under either the new Act or the New York statute, since foreign
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York amendment allows partners only the same "rights, powers and
privileges" as partners in domestic limited partnerships, New York appears to exercise a degree of control over the internal affairs of the foreign
limited partnership. Thus, if foreign limited partnerships are subject to
the same rules of liability as New York limited partnerships, the potential
"race" by limited partnership organizers to form the entity under the more
liberal laws of another jurisdiction, as has occurred with corporations,
would be eliminated. 16 6 Third, the New York statute exhibits a highly
desirable and fairly complete degree of congruence with the New York
corporation law. For example, the list of activities which will not constitute "doing business" is virtually identical to the list contained in the
Business Corporation Law. 167 Accordingly, no confusion will exist as
to whether activities conducted by one business form have the same
consequences when conducted by the other.
IX

DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

Article 10 of the new Act allows a limited partner to maintain a
derivative action against the general partners for their misconduct. In
doing so, the new Act follows the example of New York168 and Dela-0
7
ware 16 9 amendments to the old Act, as well as prior decisional law.'
Because the rights of limited partners are similar to those of corporate
shareholders, the new Act's article on derivative actions has drawn on the
corporate law. Section 1002 requires that the derivative plaintiff be a
partner both at the time of the bringing of the action and at the time of the
allegedly improper transaction, or have taken his interest directly from
one who was a partner at such time-a requirement typical of corporation
statutes. 171 Section 1003, also relying on corporation law,

72

1

requires that

a demand on the general partner to bring the action, or a suitable excuse
partnerships appear to be subject to no more onerous requirements than local ones. See J. Crane & A.
Bromberg, supra note 2, § 22A, at 108; H. Henn, supra note 2, § 98, at 161. Moreover, if a restriction
on the admission of an out ofstate partnership were constitutionally invalid, it would be so regardless
of whether it appeared in the state constitution or in a statute. Thus, the requirement of § 901 of the
new Act, mandating that such restrictions be part of the state constitution, seems superfluous.
166. States have generally refrained from regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.
W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 8425 (rev. perm. ed. 1977). However,
because of the ambivalent nature of the limited partnership--part entity, part aggregate-subjecting
them to local law would not, presumably, be constitutionally infirm. Cf. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S.
537 (1928) (foreign business trust, having association and corporate characteristics, may be subjected
to local state regulation).
167.

Compare Act of July 10, 1979, ch. 519, § 120-a(2), 1979 N.Y. Laws 1073 (McKlnney)

(effective Jan. 1, 1980) (to be codified at N.Y. Partnership Law § 120-a(2) (McKinney)) with N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 1301(b)(McKinney 1963). The new enactment omits only that portion of § 1301(b)
dealing with transactions in a corporation's own securities.
168. N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 115 to 115-c (McKinney Supp. 1978).
169. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1732 (1974).
170. E.g., Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1966); Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 54D, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277 N.Y.S.Zd 386
(1966); see Reuschlein, Limited Partner Derivative Suits, 9 St. Mary's L.J. 443 (1978).
171. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(b) (McKinney 1963); ABA-ALI Model. Bus. Corp. Act §
49 (1971). Section 1002 states: "In a derivative action, the plaintiff must be a partner at the time
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for not having made a demand, be pleaded. Similarly, section 1004
specifies that a successful plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of his legal
expenses from the award and must remit the remainder to the limited
173
partnership.
Unfortunately, the correspondence with corporation law in this article
is incomplete. For instance, New York, like other states, has enacted a
security-for-expenses statute pursuant to which plaintiff-shareholders
with small holdings in a corporation can be compelled to post security
to compensate the defendant-directors for their legal expenses should
the suit prove groundless. 174 Although it is arguable that such statutes
serve to discourage meritorious as well as unfounded suits, it would be
anomalous to impose such a requirement as to shareholder derivative
suits and not as to those involving limited partnerships. Accordingly, a
security for expenses provision has been added to the New York
limited partnership statute. 175 The new Act, however, fails to include
a similar provision.
17 7
In addition, a large number of states, 17 6 including New York,
mandate indemnification of directors for litigation expenses incurred in
the successful defense of shareholder derivative suits. The New York
statute, 178 as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 9 also re-

quire judicial approval of settlements in shareholder derivative actions.
In both instances the new Limited Partnership Act fails to make similar
provisions for general partners in the corresponding limited partnership
derivative actions. Although the New York and Delaware statutes correct
the deficiency in each case, 18 0 corresponding provisions in the new Act
would have been desirable. At least the new Act could have suggested
these as optional provisions for states having such corporate law
sections.
CONCLUSION

The new ULPA is an improvement over the old Act in many respects.
The 1916 Act was obviously deficient in its failure to deal with foreign
limited partnerships, and its failure to specify the acts which subject a
of bringing the action and (I) at the time of the transaction of which he complains or (2) his status
as a partner had devolved upon him by operation of law or pursuant to the terms of the
partnership agreement from a person who was a partner at the time of the transaction." Allowing
the derivative action to devolve pursuant to the terms of the partnership agreement seems more
liberal than most corporate statutes.
172. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(c) (McKinney 1963); H. Henn, supra note 2, § 367, at
774-75.
173. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(e) (McKinney 1963); H. Henn, supra note 2, §§ 373, 377.
174. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
175. N.Y. Partnership Law § 115-b (,Ickinney Supp. 1978),
176. See H. Henn, supra note 2, § 380, at 804-13.
177. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 721-27 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978).
178. Id. § 626(d).
179. Fed. R- Civ. P. 23.1.
180. N.Y. Partnership Law §§ 115-c, 115-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §
1732(d) (1974).
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limited partner to personal liability for exercising an improper amount of
control over partnership affairs. The new Act deals expressly with both
matters, in its article on foreign limited partnerships (article 9), and in the
provisions on control (section 303). Nevertheless, the treatment of both
matters could be more adroit. For instance, the provision as to foreign
limited partnerships is overly generous in allowing the foreign entities
greater privileges than those organized locally. Conversely, the control
provisions, perhaps because of an exaggerated fear of unfavorable tax
consequences, probably do not go far enough in permitting limited
partners to exercise control. Furthermore, the section could have been
more specific than it is as to the effect of the statute on previously litigated
control problems.
Recognizing that the limited partnership is an alternative to the corporation, especially for small business, the new Act borrows many corporate law provisions-for example, the extensive list of certificate and
filing requirements which are similar to corporation statutes. If congruence with the corporate law is desirable, this desiderata of parallell
provisions will necessitate widespread local amendment, thus sacrificing the virtue of national uniformity-a dilemma which it seems
impossible to avoid.
Certain provisions of the new law represent dubious policy decisions;
for example, those authorizing future services as consideration, and the
loan and priority provisions. In many states, their adoption will cause an
undesirable incongruity with the corporation statutes.
The prefatory note to the new Act states:
Articles 1 and 2 reflect an important change in the statutory scheme: recognition that the
basic document in any partnership, including a limited partnership, is the partnership
agreement. The certificate of limited partnership is not a constitutive document (except in
the sense that it is a statutory prerequisite to the creation of the limited partnership), and
merely reflects matters as to which creditors should be put on notice.' 8 '

Unfortunately, the draftsmanship of the new Act does not bear out this
statement. The certificate seems to have a much greater significance, with
serious potential liabilities for failure to amend, than the Note would
indicate, and yet still is not sufficient without a separate agreement. This
uneasy compromise between the functions of the two documents can only
cause interpretive difficulties.
The same interpretive difficulties are true of many other provisions of
the new Act. While certain improvements in specificity have been made
in the sections treating dissolution, the complexity of the withdrawal,
dissolution, winding up, and distribution provisions, despite their superficial clarity, will undoubtedly lead to interpretive difficulties. Judicial
resolution of these problems will be necessary.
In short, while the new Act is better than the old one, itis not that much
better. Legislators should, therefore, think twice about adopting it in its
present form.
181.

ULPA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, (1976).

